Advanced Dynamic Games Module
David K. Levine
Book:
Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson [2006]:
Repeated Games and Reputations: Long Run Relationships
Problems on Repeated Games
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1. Long Run and Short-Run Players
Simultaneous Move Games:
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Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps and E. Maskin [1990]: "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
Review of Economic Studies
, 57: 555-573
Moral Hazard Games:
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Fudenberg, Drew and David K. Levine. 1994. Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players.
Journal of Economic Theory
62, no. 1: 103-135
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Continuous Time Games:
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Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2007]: "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,"
Review of Economic Dynamics
, 10: 173-192
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2. The Folk Theorem
Finite and Infinite Horizon Folk Theorems:
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Abreu, D., P. K. Dutta and L. Smith [1994]: "Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition,"
Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin [1986]: "
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica
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54: 533-54
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Kandori, M. [1992]: "Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
Review of Economic Studies
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59: 61-80
Experiments on Repeated Games:
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Pedro Dal Bo [2005]: Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future, American Economic Review
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Imperfect Public Information:
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Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine and E. Maskin [1994]: "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,"
Econometrica
, 62: 997-1039
Private Information:
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Ely, J. C., J. Horner and W. Olszewski [2003]: "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games,"
Northwestern University
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Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1991]: "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory
, 54: 26-47
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Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [2007]: "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory
, 132: 461-473
Imitation and Evolution:
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Levine, D. K. and W. Pesendorfer [2007]: "Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation,"
Games and Economic Behavior
, 58: 293-315
3. Reputation
Perfect and Imperfect Information:
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Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982]: "Reputation and Imperfect Information,"
Journal of Economic Theory
, 50: 253-79
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Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts [1982]: "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
Econometrica
, 50: 443-60
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Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,"
Econometrica
, 57: 759-778
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Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1992]: "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,"
Review of Economic Studies
, 59: 561-580
Long Run Players:
Schmidt, K. [1991]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," mimeo
Bad Reputation:
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Ely, J. and J. Valimaki [2002]: "Bad Reputation,"
NAJ Economics
, 4: 2
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Ely, J., D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine [2008]: "When is Reputation Bad,"
Games and Economic Behavior
, 63: 498-526
*Reputation is Who You Aren't:
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Mailath, G. J. and Samuelson, L. [2001], Who Wants a Good Reputation?. R
eview of Economic Studies
, 68: 415–441.
Relationships:
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