Monday October 8: abstract/proposal due. This should be
between a
paragraph and a page. You should talk to one of us before this deadline
to discuss possible topics.
Monday October 22: final proposal due. This should be a
couple of
pages with a more detailed abstract and plan for the paper. You should
talk to one of us about the abstract before preparing the final proposal
Monday December 10 (last day of class) Paper due.
all assignments should be submitted by email by 10 pm on the date due.
references:
*Admati & Perry (1987), "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," The
Review of Economic Studies, 54(3), 345-64.
*Osborne
and Rubinstein, Chap 7.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 4.
Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model,” Econometrica, 50, 97-109.
Yildiz, M. (2003) “Bargaining Without a Common Prior - An
Immediate Agreement Theorem,” Econometrica, 71, 793-811.
Yildiz, M. (2003) “Walrasian Bargaining,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 45-2, 465-487.
Extensive form games with imperfect information slides
Sequential equilibrium
Forward Induction
references:
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 11, 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 8, 11.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) “Sequential Equilibrium,”
Econometrica, 50, 863-894.
references:
*Osborne and Rubinstein Chaps. 12.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chaps 8, 9, 11.
Cho, I.-K. and D. Kreps (1987) “Signalling Games and Stable
Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-221.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982) “Reputation and Imperfect
Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 253-279.
Milgrom and Roberts (1982), “Predation, reputation and entry
deterrence,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.
Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982)
“Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory,
27, 245-52. Fudenberg,
D. and D. Levine (1989), "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games
with a Patient Player", Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
references:
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 10.
*Gul, F, H. Sonnenschein, & Robert Wilson (1986),
“Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase
Conjecture,” Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-90.
Abreu, D. & F. Gul (2000), “Bargaining and
Reputation,” Econometrica, 68, 85-117.
Supermodular Games and Their Applications
references:
*Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990) “Rationalizability and
Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities,”
Econometrica, 58, 1255-1277.
*Vives (2005): “Complementarities and Games: New
Developments”.
*Topkis.
references:*Osborne
and Rubinstein Chap. 8.
Fudenberg and Tirole, Chap. 5.
Mailath and Samuelson.
*Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a
theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect
monitoring,” Econometrica, 58, September, 1041-1063.
Abreu, D., P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce (1991), “Information and
timing in Repeated partnerships,” Econometrica, 59, 1713-1733.
Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin (1986), “The Folk Theorem for
Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information,”
Econometrica 54, 533-54.
Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps and E. Maskin (1990), “Repeated Games
with Long-run and Short-run players,” The Review of Economic
Studies 57, 555-73. Fudenberg,
D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994), “The Folk Theorem in
Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information,”
Econometrica 62, 997-1039.
Levine: 11/12-12/10: 8 lectures (no class 11/21 -
Thanksgiving)