First Year Graduate Game Theory Course Outline

Haluk Ergin January 14 - February 27 (no class Jan 21, MLK day)

Strategic Form Games, Bayesian Games and Extensive Form Games: game theory I slides game theory 2 slides , Palgrave Strategy, Existence, Levine's slides, Palgrave Signalling Cheap talk

• Normal Form Games
• Mixed Strategies
• Best Responses
• Dominance and Rationalizability
• Nash Equilibrium
• Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
• Sequential Rationality and Subgame Perfection
• The Rubinsten Bargaining Game
• Signalling Games and the Intuitive Criterion
• Beer-Quiche
• Pooling and Separating Equilibria
• Reputation Formation

problem set 1 John Nachbar's first homework "due": February 6

first midterm exam: February 13 in class questions answers

Auctions:  auctions 1 slides auctions 2 slides

• Types of Auctions: English, descending, etc.
• Symmetric Independent Private Values
• Revenue Equivalence
• Interdependent Values
• Affiliation

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: slides

• Direct Mechanisms
• Truthful Implementation
• Vickery-Groves-Clarke Mechanism
• Budget Balance

David Levine March 3 - April 23

March 10 - 12 Spring Break

Applications and Experiments: current slides Palgrave Bargaining Purification old slides more slides bibliography David Rahmann's notes on self-confirming equilibrium 

• 1/2 Dominance
  
• Trembling Hand Perfection
• Quantal Response Equilibrium
• Correlated Equilibrium
• Risk Dominance
• Public Goods Experiments
• Coordination Games Experiments
• Centipede
  
• Bargaining
  
• Learning and Self-confirming Equilibrium

second problem set "due": March 19

second midterm exam: March 26 in class questions answers

Decision Theory: slides, bibliography [David Levine - 3.0 weeks]

• Expected Utility Theory
• Risk Aversion
• Intertemporal Preferences
• Dynamic Programming
• supplementary material: interest.xls, shiller.xls, see also Shiller's current data

third problem set fourth problem set fourth problem set answers "due": April 9

Infinite Horizon and Repeated Games Palgrave Repeated Games Palgrave Reputation repeated game slides, dal-bo, bibliography

• Limits of finite horizon games
• The folk theorem
• Folk theorem for matching games

fifth problem (answers to PS5) set "due": last day of class

final exam: ??? answers

Old Exams: