Zero Sum Games
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I was thinking of a problem with entry and exit of agents. So say that n agents of each of the two types enter every period. Types change in the sense that after a type 1 trades with a type 2, he becomes a new type (someone with the same preferences, but a new "endowment"), but types do not change randomly over time. An agent can choose to leave the game whenever he/she wants. (This question is based on work by Gale and McClennan and Sonnenschien.)
Is there any way to rule out an equilibrium which discriminates against type 2? If yes, how?
How many players of each type are in this game?
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Is this a subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinite horizon sequential bargaining game with two types and NO discounting: Type 1 demands whole pie refuses everything else, Type 2 offers whole pie, accepts anything? (Assuming agents [View full text and thread]
|02/02/2000 03:50 PM by Carolyn S.; Subgame Perfection in Infinite Horizon without Discounting|