Zero Sum Games
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I was wondering if anyone could help me out with a game theory question:
My game involves two opposing players, M and W.
M’s objective is to pay the smallest amount. W’s objective is to gain the biggest amount.
M [View full text and thread]
Hi, in 1st Semester we have no Game Theory. Nevertheless this subject fascinates me.
My question in solving any matrices (2x2/3x3): As long I do not know, if players play Weak-Dominance --> At 1st: I use [View full text and thread]
I am strugling to solve the third question of this exam. Can someone help me to solve it?
Basically, when I solve it I only find one NE ( i.e. Lr). This issue is that there are supposed to be many NE. I checked for [View full text and thread]
PLAYERS: A plaintiff and a defendant
THE ORDER OF PLAY:
1. The plaintiff decides whether to bring suit against the defendant at cost c.
2. The plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer of s>0.
3. The defendant accepts [View full text and thread]
I know that for 2x2 games with two strict equilibrium strategies A and B, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one with a higher product of deviation losses (i.e. what each player would lose by not playing the equilibrium if the other [View full text and thread]
I think the answers to both questions are negative. Consider a two-player game where two players (1 and 2) choose the numbers x_1, x_2 from the set [0,2], and the payoff of each player is given by u_i(x_1,x_2)=x_i+(x_1-x_2)^2. Then [View full text and thread]
Do we know that each nash equlibrium strategy in such a game is symmetric, too? [View full text and thread]
is there some theorem stating, that in every continuous game with symmetric players every nash equlibrium will yield the same utility to all players?
Or something like this for special cases?
The theorem seems quite natural to [View full text and thread]
Pakistani wedding dresses [View full text and thread]
Septum piercing pain, dangers and jewelry. [View full text and thread]
Landscaping ideas for front of house are easy to come by, but none of these ideas is actually helpful if you cannot apply them in your home. Let's see how we cam make use of these ideas in a more natural, modern way.
15 Landscaping [View full text and thread]
You must carry out each exercise at a degree where it feels a few-what tough and where you feel fatigued on the last repetition of each set. [View full text and thread]
Suppose I have a game in extensive form as follows. Player 1 moves first and chooses R, M or L. If he chooses R, the game ends. Otherwise, the game reaches a non-trivial inform[ation set of player 2. At this information [View full text and thread]
How does one handle non-pareto Nash Equilibria in recursive games.
Using game-tree approaches, I am dealing with the situation when
at each move, the two players issue their moves simultaneously. Of course,
one can get several [View full text and thread]
Consider a game where two players (1,2) chooses between two strategies (A,B). The payoff vectors are: p(A,A)=(1,0), p(B,B)=(0,0), p(A,B)=(2,2), p(B,A)=(2,2).
There are clearly 2 Nash equilibria ((A,B) and (B,A)), but intuitively, only [View full text and thread]
Hello! Newbie here with a quick one for ya..
In Yahtzee (or similar dice game), if a player rolls 6,6,6,5,5 *EARLY in the game*, is it optimal to play 3-of-a-kind for 28, or fullhouse for 25?
Ultimately, the simple objective is to [View full text and thread]
I am a graduate student writing a paper using game theory. I have attached the normal form game, but am not sure how to interpret the equilibrium. This game player 1 moves first and players 2 and 3 are simultaneous after p1 [View full text and thread]
I want to set up a sequential voting game for 2 persons - voting for candidate 1 or 2 - that takes into account the results of a previous vote. The difference in the previous vote needs to be incorporated into the new game (either in [View full text and thread]
I am not very familiar with game theory, I have a simple question: In several times play(finite of infinite), if the two players' payoff matrices are different in different times, but each player should have to consider the past [View full text and thread]
See attached file - question about when a multi-player game is factorizable/separable...... [View full text and thread]