I was wondering If you could post your in class notes to today's lecture and wednesday's as some people may not be there due to the Jewish holidays
Hello everyone, the exam has been graded and you can come to my office to pick up your blue books. I would be in office, Seigle Hall 378 on Friday, from 9:00 to 12:00 in the morning and after 8:00 at night. Otherwise I would take the
If the firms are symmetric, say, they have the same marginal cost, then you could use this way; but if they have different marginal cost, you'd better derive the reaction functions from each firm's profit maximum problem.
For solving a problem in which you have to find the Cournot equlibrium on the exam, would it be okay to use the formula x(bar)=a-c/b(n+1) and find the answer from there, rather than deriving that formula from the profit
Hello everyone, I am the TA. As someone asked me to provide some help about the notes, I am wondering to give some office hours tonight after 7:30, my office is Seigle Hall 378; everyone is welcome if you have doubts. Sorry for
http://www.dklevine.com/texts/index.php3?pwrd=guest you want the folder intermediate | game theory | problems
This was briefly mentioned in class today... the mafia has a code of silence (omertà) used to sidestep the prisoner's dilemma. The Wikipedia article (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omerta) is fairly interesting and illustrates the
Professor Levine, I know you said on the first day of class that we could email you to ask you to make more practice problems available, and I was just wondering if you could please direct me to more problems like the ones from the
Siegle L06 Fridays 10:00 am - 11:30 am optional TA recitation section to review problems
[View full text]By request: the first lecture with all my scribbling.