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Akin, E. and V. Losert [1984]: "Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games," Journal of Mathematical Biology, 20: 213-258.
Aoyagi, M. [1994]: "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of a Normal Form Game," Princeton.
Arthur, B., Y. Ermol'ev and Y. Kanioskii [1983]: "A generalized urn problem and applications," Cybernetica, 19: 61-71.
Auer, P., N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund and R. Schapire [1995]: "Gambling in a rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem," 36th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
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Banerjee, A. and D. Fudenberg [1995]: "Word of Mouth Communication," Harvard.
Banos, A. [1968]: "On Pseudo-Games," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 39: 1932-1945.
Basu, K. [1985]: "Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games," Princeton University.
Battigalli, P. [1987]: "Comportamento Razionale ed Eqiulibrio nei Giochi e nelli Situatzioni Sociali," Bocconi University Ph.D. Dissertation.
Benaim, M. and M. Hirsch [1994]: "Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games," UC Berkeley.
Benaim, M. and M. Hirsch [1995]: "Asymptotic Pseudo-Trajectories, Chain-Recurrent Flows, and Stochastic Approximation," Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations, forthcoming .
Benaim, M. and M. Hirsch [1996]: "Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games," UC Berkeley.
Bergin, J. and B. Lippman [1995]: "Evolution with State Dependent Mutations," Queens University.
Bernheim, D. B. [1984]: "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, 52: 1007-1028.
Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson [1992]: "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 278-305.
Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson [1993]: "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," University College London.
Binmore, K. and L. Samuelson [1995]: "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," University College London.
Binmore, K., L. Samuelson and K. Vaughn [1995]: "Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, 11: 1-35.
Bjornerstedt, J. [1995]: "Experimentation, Imitation, and Evolutionary Dynamics," Stockholm University.
Bjornerstedt, J. and J. Weibull [1995]: "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior, Ed. K. Arrow et al, (London: Macmillan).
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Blackwell, D. [1956]: "An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs," Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 6: 1-8.
Blackwell, D. [1956]: "Controlled Random Walks," Proceedings International Congress of Mathematicians, (Amsterdam: North Holland), 1954 III: 336-338.
Blume, A., Y. G. Kim and J. Sobel [1993]: "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, 5: 31-57.
Blume, L. [1993]: "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, 5: 387-424.
Bomze, I. [1986]: "Noncooperative two-person games in Biology: A Classification," International Journal of Game Theory, 15: 31-57.
Borgers, T. [1994]: "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, 4, 265-276.
Borgers, T. and R. Sarin [1995]: "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," University College London.
Borgers, T. and R. Sarin [1996]: "Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations," University College London.
Boylan, R. [1990]: "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals,," Washington University of St. Louis..
Boylan, R. [1994]: "Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Games and Economic Behavior, 7: 10-34.
Boylan, R. [1994]: "Evolutionqry Equilibria Resistant to Mutations," Games and Economic Behavior, 7: 10-34.
Boylan, R. and E. El-Gamal [1993]: "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 205-222.
Brown, G. W. [1951]: "Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play," In Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Ed. T.C. Koopmans, (New York: Wiley).
Bullard, J. and J. Duffy [1994]: "Using genetic algorithms to model the evolution of heterogenous beliefs," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Bush, R. and R. Mosteller [1955]: Stochastic Models of Learning, (New York: Wiley).
Cabrales and J. Sobel [1992]: "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 473-504.
Cabrales, A. [1993]: "Stochastic Replicator Dynamics," UCSD.
Canning, D. [1991]: "Social Equilibrium," Cambridge University.
Canning, D. [1992]: "Average Behavior in Learning Models," Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 442-472.
Cheung, Y. and D. Friedman [1994]: "Learning in Evolutionary Games: Some Laboratory Results," Santa Cruz.
Chung, T. [1994]: "Approximate Methods for Sequential Decision Making Using Expert Advice," Proceedings of the 7th Annual ACM Conference on Computational Learning Theory, 183-189: 1994.
Crawford, V. [1995]: "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Econometrica, 63,103-158.
Crawford, V. and J. Sobel [1982]: "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, 50: 1431-1452.
Cross, J. [1983]: A Theory of Adaptive Economic Behavior, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Degroot, M. [1970]: Optimal Statistical Decisions, (New York: McGraw-Hill).
Dekel, E. and D. Fudenberg [1990]: "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, 52: 243--267.
Dekel, E. and S. Scotchmer [1992]: "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 392-406.
Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine [1996]: "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," HIER D.P. 1774 Harvard University.
Desantis, A., G. Markowski and M. Wegman [1992]: "Learning Probabilistic Prediction Functions," Proceedings of the 1988 Workshop of Computational Learning, 312-328.
Diaconis, P. and D. Freedman [1990]: "On the Uniform Consistency of Bayes Estimates with Multinomial Probabilities," The Annals of Statistics, 18: 1317-1327.
Edwards, W. [1961]: "Probability Learning in 1000 Trials," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62: 385-394.
Ellison, G. [1993]: "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, 61: 1047-1071.
Ellison, G. [1994]: "Learning with One Rational Player," MIT.
Ellison, G. [1995]: "Basins of Attraction and Long-Run Equilibria," MIT.
Ellison, G. and D. Fudenberg [1993]: "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, 101: 612-643.
Ely, J. [1995]: "Local Conventions," Northwestern University.
Er'ev, I. and A. Roth [1996]: "On The Need for Low Rationality Cognitive Game Theory: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria," University of Pittsburgh.
Eshel, I. and E. Akin [1983]: "Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions," Journal of Mathematical Biology, 18: 123-233.
Farrell, J. [1986]: "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games," UC Berkeley.
Feder, M., N. Mehrav and M. Gutman [1992]: "Universal Prediction of Individual Sequences," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 38: 1258-1270.
Forges, F. [1986]: "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Econometrica, 54: 1375-1386.
Foster, D. and P. Young [1990]: "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Theoretical Population Biology, 38: 219-232.
Foster, D. and R. Vohra [1993]: "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Wharton.
Foster, D. and R. Vohra [1995]: "Asymptotic Calibration," Wharton School.
Foster, D. and R. Vohra [1996]: "Regret in the On-line Decision Problem," Wharton School.
Freund, Y. and R. Schapire [1995]: "A Decision Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting," Proceedings of the Second European Conference on Computational Learning, ?:???.
Friedlin, M. and A. Wentzell [1982]: Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems, (New York: Springer Verlag).
Friedman, D. [1991]: "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, 59: 637-666.
Friedman, D. [1996]: "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Friedman, E. and S. Shenker [1995]: "Synchronous and Asynchronous Learning by Responsive Learning Automata," Duke University.
Fudenberg, D. and C. Harris [1992]: "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, 57: 420-441.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, 57 (July): 759-778.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1992]: "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Not Observed," Review of Economic Studies, ???.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1993]: "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, 61: 523-546.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1993]: "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium,," Econometrica, 61 (May): 547-573.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1995]: "Conditional Universal Consistency," UCLA.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1995]: "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19 : 1065-1090.
Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine [1996]: "Measuring Subject's Losses in Experimental Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
Fudenberg, D. and D. Kreps [1990]: "Lectures on Learning and Equilibrium in Strategic-Form Games," CORE Lecture Series.
Fudenberg, D. and D. Kreps [1993]: "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, 5: 320-367.
Fudenberg, D. and D. M. Kreps [1988]: "Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games," Stanford.
Fudenberg, D. and D. M. Kreps [1995]: "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior.
Fudenberg, D. and D. M. Kreps [1995]: "Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium," Harvard.
Fudenberg, D. and E. Maskin [1990]: "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, 80: 274-279.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole [1991]: Game Theory, (Cambridge: MIT Press).
Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine and E. Maskin [1994]: "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, 62: 997-1039.
Fudenberg, D., D. M. Kreps and D. K. Levine [1988]: "On The Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, 44: 354--380.
Futia, C. [1982]: "Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models," Econometrica, 50: 377-408.
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Last updated: August 01, 2000